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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS P. SPRUNT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO 
GRANDE WESTERN RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY, a corpo-
ration, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
RE: SPRUNT vs. D & R G 
Plaintiff was injured in an accident which occurred 
during plaintiff's regular course of employment as a 
switchman for the defendant. The accident occurred on 
tracks leading into and on property allegedly owned by 
the Vitro Chemical Company in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
The evidence showed that for a substantial period of 
time the roadbed upon which plaintiff and the switch 
crews of the defendant were required to walk was full 
of holes averaging from a few inches to 8 and 10 inches 
and occasionally 12 inches deep. That these holes were 
caused by reason of the fact that the Vitro Chemical 
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Company used. a clam shell and a bulldozer to maintain 
the levelness of the roadbed and also to remove chemical 
ore from the site of the roadbed. That the defendant 
railroad made no effort to maintain or inspect these 
premises upon which it sent its mnployees to perform 
work. 
The evidence showed that the unsafe condition had 
existed for a substantial period of time, that the Union 
had protested in September 1956, some four months be-
fore the accident to plaintiff, and again in December 1956, 
approximately 3 weeks_ before the accident; that each 
time promises . to correct these conditions were made by 
officials of the defendant railroad but that no effort was 
made by the railroad to maintain the roadbed in a level 
condition and no actions were taken by the railroad to 
make good its promises. The evidence further showed 
that the plaintiff had knowledge of this irregular condi-
tion and that he had known of its defective condition for 
1nany months prior to that day of his injury. 
On the day that the plaintiff was injured the roadbed 
was covered with snow and the holes and depressions and 
irregularities in the roadbed were covered so that they 
were not visible, although plaintiff had walked along the 
roadbed and knew that holes were still there. \Vhile in 
the process of mounting a ear which was a necessary act 
and which he perforn1ed in the usual custmnary fashion, 
one of plaintiff's feet slipped into a hole some 6 or 8 
inches deep, he fell and suffered an injury resulting in 
a 50% loss of the use of his left arm ~t the shoulder, 
which damage and injury was the subject of the action. 
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The undisputed testimony of the plaintiff was that 
he did not know of the existence of the hole in which he 
stepped prior to his fall and that the same was not visible 
to him by reason of the fact that it was filled with snow. 
No evidence was introduced to show that plaintiff should 
have known of the hole unless it could be inferred from 
his prior knowledge of the generally defective condition 
of the area generally. 
The jury found for the plaintiff but found that he 
was guilty of contributory negligence and that he was 
66-213 o/o responsible for his injuries. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 'TO THE JURY. 
POINT II 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES IS INADEQUATE IN LAW. 
Do the facts involved herein constitute contributory 
negligence 1 It is necessary for some basic understanding 
of the facts upon which contributory negligence can be 
predicated. 
The court by instruction 12 stated: 
''You are instructed that you cannot infer 
or find liability on the part of the railroad com-
pany from the mere fact that an injury took place. 
Accidents do happen without negligence or liabili-
ty on the part of either party to a suit. Therefore, 
if you believe from the evidence in this case that 
the occurrence, resulting in injuries to plaintiff, 
was caused without negligence or fault on the 
part of defendant, then your verdict must be in 
favor of defendant, and 11gainst the plaintiff 'no 
cause of action'.'' 
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As the instruction indicates, the fact that an accident 
took place does not in and of itself prove either negli-
gence or contributory negligence. It is not a one-way 
street, although the defendant would have one take that 
position. In other words, the carTier contends that the 
mere fact that an injury occurred does not prove or tend 
to prove or create any inference that the Company was 
negligent. On the other hand, the carrier contends that 
it is permitted to argue the faet of contributory negli-
gence from the n1ere fact that plaintiff sustained an in-
JUry. 
This obviously is incorrect. The Court in Williams 
v. Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., Utah 1951, 230 P2 316, quotes 
with approval an instruction of the trial court in part 
as follows at page 323: 
'' * * *To establish the defense of contribu-
tory negligence the burden is upon the defendant 
to prove, by a preponder.ance of evidence, that 
the plaintiff was negligent and that such negli-
gence contributed in smne degree as a. proximate 
cause of the injury.'' 
By a preponderance of the evidence n1eans a substan-
tial evidence. A jury may not ~onjecture or speculate 
but must have substantial evidence upon which to base a 
verdict. (Anderson v. N1~:ron, Utah, 1943, 139 P2d 216) 
The above view was reaffinned in Alvarado l:. 
Tucker, Utah, 1954, 268 P2d 986, ·wherein Justice Crock-
ett speaking for the Court relative to the problen1 of 
burden of proof states at page 988: 
'' ( 3,6) The burden was upon plaintiff to 
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prove the charge of speeding ; such a finding of 
fact could not be based on mere speculation or 
conjecture, but only on .a preponderance of the 
evidence. This means the greater weight of the 
evidence, or as someti1nes stated, such degree of 
proof that the greater probability of truth lies 
therein. A choice of probabilities does not meet 
this requirement. It creates only a basis for con-
jecture, on which a verdict of the jury cannot 
stand." 
It has been established without any question that 
the mere fact that plaintiff fell does not establish con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. It was 
established without debate that plaintiff did not know of 
the existence of the hole in which he stepped and fell 
prior to stepping into it. This, of course, relates only 
to the problem of actual knowledge. Did he have con-
structive knowledge of the existence of this hole~ This 
requires a review of the evidence. The evidence relating 
to this is proof and is as set forth below. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 'TO THE JURY. 
The testimony for the plaintiff indicated that the 
area in which the plaintiff was compelled to work was in 
deplorable condition, exceptionally rough, full of holes, 
goudge markes and other rough areas and constitut-
ed a hazaradous condition. This condition had existed for 
some months prior to this injury (Tr. 105 ). On Septem-
ber 26, officials of the Switchman's Union took the de-
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fendant 's Safety Engineer to the property to show him 
and at that time the area was impassable by foot (Tr. 
105, 106, 112, 114). 
Conversations were had between Mr. S1nith and Mr. 
Griffith, Assistant Superintendent, as late as the 27th 
day of December, relative to correcting this difficulty, 
however, nothing was done. Promises were made relative 
to correcting these difficulties which were never complied 
with. The only testimony as to the manner in which the 
plaintiff was injured and his knowledge of these condi-
tions come from the witness, Mr. Patterson, and plaintiff 
himself, and is as follows: 
MR. PATTERSON: (Page 15, 16, lines 28 to 30, line 1) 
Q. Now, Mr. Patterson, what, if anything, did 
the Vitro Uranium maintain between this 
new spur switch and the hopper spur switch 
at this time~ 
A. Under the condition they didn't maintain any 
of them. 
(Page 20, line 6-8) 
Q. (By Mr. Patterson) ~Ir. Patterson, what 
was the weather that day~ 
A. Well, there was snow on the ground, as I 
recall, it was snowing just a little bit at the 
time. 
(By Mr. Patterson, page 2:2, lines 1 to :22) 
Q. Now, you had had occasion to walk in that 
area earlier also that day, hadn't you~ 
A. Yes sir, when I coupled the air hoses on the 
cars. 
Q. Tell the jury if you will the condition of that 
road bed in that area? 
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A. Well, it was very rough-holes, mounds, there 
was enough snow on the ground that made 
it hard to detect the holes filled with snow and 
it was generally in a very poor condition. 
Q. Now, how long had it been in that condition 
to your knowledge~ 
A. It had been in that condition for a long time, 
we had complained to the company. 
MR. ASHTON: Just a minute, may we have 
stricken the last part, it is not responsive. We 
would like to have the foundation laid so we can 
meet that particular testimony. 
THE COURT: It may be stricken. 
Q. (By l\1r. Patterson) You say for a long time, 
can you tell me in terms of months how long~ 
A. I know it was five or six months because we 
had the safety man on the Rio Grande system 
come to the Vitro and inspect it under our 
complaints. 
:MR. SPRUNT: (Page 42, lines 2 to 30; page 43, lines 1 
to 7) 
Q. (By nir. Patterson) You say you were start-
ing to mount the cars~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why would you do that~ 
A. When you are shoving through that place 
where the hopper is, there is a shed there, 
when you get inside that shed the engineer 
can't see inside the shed, I was going to ride 
the cars up so when M·r. Patterson got on 
through I could stop the head car at the hop-
per. 
Q. You could walk two miles an hours~ 
A. Yes, as a general rule we always climb it 
because the engineer couldn't see me where 
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I was at and I could pass signals to Mr. 
Patterson. 
Q. In other words, it was necessary for you to 
climb on the car~ 
A. Yes sir. 
MR. ASHTON: I object, the court please, 
it is calling for a conclusion. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled, 
the answer may stand. 
Q. (By Mr. Patterson) Now, what happened 
when you-describe how you started to mount 
the car, what you did~ 
A. Well, as a general rule when you are switch-
ing on a lead, or anything, we most generally 
hit the stirrup with our right foot and most 
generally reach up with the one hand, get hold 
of the grab iron and follow up with the other, 
when I went to follow up I slipped in the 
meantime, and I couldn't get the grab iron. 
Q. Why did you slip~ 
A. I stepped in a hole. 
Q. Will you describe that hole to the jury, 
please~ 
A. Well, as far as I ren1ember, it was a hole 
along side the cars where we walked, 1nade 
by the clam shovel cleaning up the ore. 
Q. Describe the hole itself as much as you can~ 
A. I would say the hole was around between 
eight and twelve inches deep. 
(Page 49, lines 9 to 26) 
Q. (By 1\lr. Patterson) "\Vill you describe the 
condition of the roadbed in the area between 
this new spur switch and the hopper spur 
switch, particularly at the tune that you sus-
tained your injury~ 
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A. Well, I will say it was awfully rough, it was 
full of holes from where the clam shell had 
picked up the ore they had dumped from the 
cars, they couldn't get all the ore out of there. 
Q. How long had this condition existed prior to 
this to your knowledge~ 
A. I would say around six n1onths at least. 
Q. Now, what was the weather that day? 
A. It had been snowing--it was snowing. 
Q. And could you see th(~Se holes~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. Why~ 
A. Because it had snowed all night and a lot of 
the holes was filled with snow. 
(Cross Examination by Mr. Ashton, page 57, lines 
24 to 30; page 58, lines 1 to 14) 
Q. You have, of course, a large area you can 
choose to board this car~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. You didn't have to get on, did you, at this 
particular point~ 
A. No, I didn't have to. 
Q. These cars are moving two to three miles an 
hour and you could have, if you elected to, 
to walk along there~ 
A. I don't know I could have walked that fast 
there the way the roadbed was. 
Q. You elected to get on the car at this particular 
point? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You chose at this particular point to get on 
the car~ 
A. That is right. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. This was broad daylight~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You were aware of the fact where cars were 
unloaded and the clam shell worked and would 
make gouges, and were aware of the fact 
snow had fallen and concealed rough spots 
under the snow, you were aware of that? 
A. Yes. 
(Page 59, lines 5 to 30; page 60, lines 1 to 3) 
Q. Mr. Sprunt, I am not trying to get you, in de-
tailing the matter to relate what each muscle 
did in this particular tme. When you reached 
up, what was the usual way to do it, put the 
weight on one hand f 
A. Most generally put the weight on both hands. 
Q. You reached with the left hand, and hadn't 
got your weight up~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. You were walking when this occurred 1 
A. No. 
Q. You were standing still f 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you were standing still when the car came 
past going about two or three miles an hour, 
and you reached up ·with your left hand~ 
A. Yes sir, that is right. 
Q. Were you standing in a hole' 
A. No I wasn't. 
Q. Did you n1ove your feet before you got 
aboard~ 
A. That is son1ething I can't say. 
Q. As you reached with your left hand, as you 
started to board, your foot went in a hole~ 
A. No, generally when you are boarding a car 
you swing yourself on, when I went to swing 
10 
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on I slipped. 
Q. When you swung to go on to board you step-
ped, do you know which foot~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. You slipped with your foot in a hole1 
A. Yes sir. 
(Page 92, lines 26-30; page 93, lines 1-3) 
Q. (By l\1r. Patterson) \Vas there any differ-
ence in the condition of the roadbed after the 
visit you have mentioned~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did they cease to have these holes In the 
roadbed~ 
A. What is that~ 
Q. Did they cease to have holes in the roadbed 
after these officials had been there~ 
A. No. 
Mr. Hayden and Mr. Smith testified as follows as 
to visits to the premises with officials of the defendant 
and conversations relative thereto : 
MR. HAYDEN: (Page 104, lines 14-30, page 105, lines 
1-24) 
Q. (By Mr. Patterson) Did you have occasion 
during that period of time to contact an offi-
cial of the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad 
relative to the premises~ 
A. Yes. 
MR. ASHTON: Excuse me, Mr. Patterson, 
let me have that time. 
MR. PATTERSON: In September. 
MR. ASHTON: In September of-
MR. PATTERSON: 1956. 
Q. (By Mr. Patterson) When was that' 
11 
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A. That was, I believe on the 27th. 
Q. Of what¥ 
A. Of September in '56. 
Q. Now, whom did you contact~ 
A. Mr. Pete Ackermann. 
Q. Who is he? 
A. He was the assistant superintendent of safety. 
Q. For whom? 
A. By the Denver and Rio Grande. 
Q. And why did you contact him~ 
A. Because I was a member of the safety com-
mittee and we knew that a hazardous condi-
tion existed at Vitro Chemical Company. 
Q. A hazardous condition relative to what? 
A. Relative to footing along the trackage. 
Q. And what did you and Mr. Ackermann do¥ 
A. Well, we were on a tour of the Roper yards 
and we proceeded to Yitro Chemical, that we 
found the conditions so bad there that we-
:MR. ASHTON: ~fay we have the witnes~ 
testify what he saw rather than characterize it. 
THE COURT: It is not proper to draw your 
own opinions, that is the duty of the jury. Tell 
what you saw. 
A. We saw holes along the trackage, which were 
water and mud, and we proceeded to a point 
which was impossible on foot. 
Q. And then what did you do"? 
A. We turned around and carne back off the 
property. 
Q. And what, if anything, did ~[r. Ackermann 
say about this situation at that time, or sub-
sequent to that time~ 
A. Mr. Ackermann said that he would have the 
12 
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condition taken care of. 
MR. SMITH : (Page 113, lines 9 to 15) 
Q. (By :Mr. Patterson) Did you and Mr. Acker-
mann and Mr. Hayden go out to that prop-
erty~ 
A Yes sir. 
Q. What did you discover when you went out 
there~ 
A. Well, the conditions were such we went up as 
far as we could go in our oxfords and had to 
truck from that point and he told us the con-
ditions would be corrected. 
From the above, it will be seen that the only basis 
upon which actual or constructive knowledge of 
the existence of the hole could be imputed to the 
plaintiff would be on the basis he knew for a period of 
six months that the area upon which he was compelled 
to work was dangerous, defective and unsafe. Is this 
sufficient~ 
The question answers itself in that this does not 
constitute negligence but on the contrary is a form of 
assumption of risk which had been outlawed by the 1939 
amendment to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 54. 
This problem as to what constitutes assumption of 
risk, which is outlawed by statute, and what constitutes 
contributory negligence on the part of an employee is a 
difficult close question. However, an examination of the 
law prior to 1939 and the law subsequent to 1939 dis-
closes a very interesting fact, namely, that the facts in 
issue have always been held to be facts constituting the 
13 
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defense of assumption of risk. 
Thus, in Kansas City Railroad Co. v. Roe, Okla. 
1919, 180 P. 371, the Court held that a switchman having 
knowledge of the rough and uneven condition of a track 
assumed the risk of the derailment which was caused 
by the defective condition of the roadbed. 
In Edwards v. Southern Rai,Zroad Co., Ga., 184 S.E. 
370, the Court held as a matter of law that an experienced 
switchman assumed the risk of injury from soft uneven 
dirt and gravel alongside the track, that he also assumed 
the risk of broken, rotten and uneven cross ties as well 
as the absence of ballast between the cross ties at a place 
where a switchman attempted to mount an engine. 
It will be observed that the facts in this case are 
almost precisely the facts involved in the case at bar. 
In Lehi Valley Railroad Co. v. Hatmaker, Pa., 69 
F.2d 282, a railroad switchman who slipped and fell in-
juring his knee while closing a switch was held not to 
be entitled to recovery because he assun1ed the risk of 
injury from frost, grease and dirt on the ties by reason 
of the fact that he had knowledge thereof, and in addition 
had knowledge of the defective condition of the ground 
below the ties. 
Finally, the Supre1ne Court of the lTnited States 
upheld this conclusion in Delaware L. & W. RR v. Koske, 
49 S. C. 202, 279 U. S. 7. There, a switchman who had 
worked for years in a yard stepped into an open ditch 
and fell while in the process of jumping from a locomo-
14 
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tive. The Supre1ne Court held that he had assumed the 
risk of this condition and could not recover. 
In all of these cases the question was not the question 
of the negligence of the employee which would only miti-
gate dmnages, but that of an absolute defense to any 
damages on the basis of assumption of risk, and uniform-
ly under the facts at bar, as the preceding cases set forth, 
the defense was found to be good as a matter of law. 
In the year 1939 the Congress of the United States 
enacted provision of the Court now known as Title 45 
U.S.C.A. Section 54, which legislatively abolished the 
doctrine of assumption of risk. In this case we now have 
the carrier attempting to use the smne facts which form-
erly constituted the defense of assumption of risk but 
which they now call contributory negligence. The ques-
tion is, can that be done~ 
It is submitted that the Supren1e Court of the United 
States in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 318 
U.S. 54, 87 L.Ed. 610, has answered this contention once 
and for all. In the Tiller case the plaintiff's husband 
was a policeman for the railroad who had the duty of 
inspecting seals on cars while they were in the yard. 
While so engaged in his employment the decedent was 
struck and killed by an unlighted switch engine. Tiller 
was using a flashlight to assist him in inspecting the seals 
on the train which was moving slowly along one track 
when he was suddenly hit and killed by the rear car of 
another train which was moving in the opposite direction. 
The railroad claimed that the plaintiff should not be 
15 
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permitted to recover because of his knowledge of condi-
tions. 
ar-
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Black, stated: 
"We hold that every vestige of the doctrine 
of assumption of risk was obliterated from the 
law by the 1939 amendment, and that Congress, 
by abolishing the defense of assumption of risk 
in that statute, did not mean to leave open the 
identical defense for the master by changing its 
name to 'non-negligence.' As this Court said in 
facing the hazy margin between negligence and 
assumption of risk as involved in the Safety Ap-
pliance Act of (:March 2) 189H, 45 USCA §1, 'Un-
less great care be taken, the servant's right will 
be sacrificed by simply charging him with a as-
sumption of the risk under another name'; and 
no such result can be permitted here." 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the concurring opinion 
pointed out the problmn, which is precisely the problem 
which we have at bar, stating at page 620: 
"The point is illustrated by two opinions of 
Mr. Justice Holn1es. In Schlennner Y. Buffalo, R. 
& P. R. Co. 205 US 1, 12, 13, 51 L ed 681, 686, 27 S 
Ct 407, he called attention to the danger of reliev-
ing from liability for negligence by talking about 
'assumption of risk'-a danger resulting from 
the ambiguity of the phrase. 'Assu1nption of risk' 
by an employee 1nay be a \Yay of expressing the 
conclusion that he has been guilty of contributory 
negligence. But an employee cannot be charged 
with contributory negligence simply because he 
'assumed the risk' ; the inquiry is, did his conduct 
depart from that of a reasonably prudent em-
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ployee in his situation' As Mr. Justice Holmes 
admonished us in the Schlemmer Case, 'unless 
great care be taken, the servant's rights will be 
sacrificed by simply charging him with assump-
tion of the risk under another name.' " 
That the amendment and the decision in the Tiller 
case has resulted in a complete about face on this prob-
lem is illustrated by the case of Georgia 8. & F. RR Co. 
v. Williamson, 65 S.E. 2d 44, in which the Supreme 
Court of Georgia completely reversed Edwards v. South-
ern Railroad Co., supra. By reason of the Tiller de-
cision, the Supreme Court of Georgia now held that a 
switchman did not assume any risk of damage because 
he continued to work in a railroad yard knowing that 
loose coal and other debris was scattered about and that 
he did not assume the risk of an injury sustained when 
he stumbled on such debris and fell under a moving box 
car. 
Since the Tiller case there have been six Federal 
Second decisions on this subject, the first of which is to be 
found in Anderson v Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway 
Co., 7th Circuit, Ill., 227 F. 2d 91. In this case the switch-
man brought an action for injuries sustained by reason 
of a fall on ice in the railroad yards. The Court claimed 
that the evidence showed no negligence on the part of 
the carrier and upon the basis of the evidence that there 
was no proof of any negligence, the Court found: 
"Obviously, in the instant case, plaintiff at 
the time he went to work had knowledge of the 
icy condition of the yards, as did the defendant, 
and being familiar with the situation could be 
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held under the reasoning of Aeby to have taken 
'the risk of known conditions and dangers.' How-
ever, unfortunately for defendant, the re.asoning 
of the Aeby case has been definitely repudiated 
by the Supreme Court in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast 
Line Railroad Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 
L. Ed. 610. In that case the District Court allowed 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, which 
was affirmed by the Court of Appe.als, 4 Cir., 128 
F. 2d 420. 
''The Supren1e Court in reversing stated, 318 
U.S. at page 57, 63 S. Ct. at page 446: 'The Circuit 
Court distinguished between assumption of risk 
as a defense by employers against the conse-
quence of their own negligence, and assumption of 
risk as negating .any conclusion that negligence 
existed at all.' 
''That, in our view, is precisely what the 
Supreme Court did in .Aeby. The Supreme Court 
in Tiller, in response to the reasoning of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, stated, 318 U.S. at page 
58, 63 S. Ct. at page 446: '\Ye find it unnecessary 
to consider whether there is any 1nerit in such a 
conceptual distinction between aspects of assump-
tion of risk which seem functionally so identical, 
and hence we need not pause oYer the rases cited 
by the Court below, all decided before the 1939 
amendment, which treat assun1ption of risk some-
times as a defense to negligence, someti1nes as the 
equivalent to non-negligence.' 
"Following this state1nent the court cites in 
a footnote the Aeby case .as one which had treated 
assumption of risk 'as the equivalent of non-negli-
gence.' The court on the same page continued: 
'We hold that every vestige of the doctrine of 
assumption of risk was obliterated from the law 
18 
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by the 1939 amendment, and that Congress, by 
abolishing the defense of assumption of risk in 
that statute, did not mean to leave open the identi-
cal defense for the master by changing its name 
to 'non-negligence.''' 
Following this case is the one of Texas and Pacific 
Railway Co. v. Buckles, 232 F.2d 257. The plaintiffs were 
members of switch crew bound for the round house. 
Their switch engine temporarily stopped pursuant to a 
red light. At that time another switch engine attempted 
to couple under the rear thereof without warning and at 
an excessive speed. The defendant requested an instruc-
tion which reads as follows: 
''Where an employee of a common carrier 
by railroad operating in interstate commerce anti-
cipates the risk resulting from the possible neg-
ligence of a fellow-employee, or should under 
the circumstances anticipate such risk, and de-
cides to chance that particular risk, he cannot re-
cover for an injury resulting from such negli-
gence. Therefore, if you find that complainant 
anticipated, or should have anticipated, the im-
pact resulting from the coupling attempt and 
knew, or should have known, of the risk inherent 
in such an attempt and chanced that risk your 
verdict must be for the defendant.'' 
This instruction was refused by the trial court. The 
railroad then appealed from a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiffs and based it's argument in part on the re-
quested instructions given above The Court of Appeal 
refused to buy the argument, stating: 
''Specification 6 is that the trial court erred 
in refusing to• give special charge 9 requested by 
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the defendant. Appellant relies particularly upon 
an expression in the concurring opinion of Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast 
Line R. Co., supra, 318, U.S. at page 71, 63 S. Ct. 
at page 453. 
'' 'By sp(!cific provisions in the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, it has swept away assump-
tion of risk as a defense once negligence is estab-
lished. But it has left undisturbed the other mean-
ing of assumption of risk, namely, that an em-
ployee injured as a consequence of being exposed 
to a risk which the employer in the exercise of 
due care could not avoid is not entitled to recover, 
since the employer was not negligent. ' 
"If appellant's counsel had read the succeed-
ing page of the concurring opinion, he would have 
found the answer to his contention: 
'' 'Assumption of risk as a defense where 
there is negligence has been written out of the 
Act. But assumption of risk, in the sense that the 
employer is not liable for those risks which it 
could not avoid in the observance of its duty of 
care, has not been written out of the law. Because 
of its ambiguity the phrase assumption of risk 
is a hazardous legal tool. As .a 1neans of instruct-
ing a jury, it is bound to create confusion. It 
should therefore be discarded.' 318 U.S. page 72, 
63 S. Ct. at page 453. '' 
Again it will be seen that the facts upon which the 
defendant is now basing its defense of contributory negli-
gence is not contributory negligence at all but oil the 
contrary is the old doctrine of assumption of risk now 
being reviewed under a different nan1e. This :Mr. Sprunt 
cannot be held neligent because he might have anticipated 
an injury because of the defective condition of the road 
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and especially when the defects were obscured by snow. 
In Johnson v Erie Railroad Co., N.Y. 236 F. 2d 352. 
Plaintiff was injured while working in a railway car be-
tween two other cars standing on a spur track as a result 
of an impact caused by a coupling, which coupling the 
plaintiff alleged was without warning. From a judge-
ment in favor of the defendant the plaintiff appealed and 
the case was reversed and sent back for new trial in part 
because of the court's confusing of the issues of negli-
gence with that of assumption of risk, stating at page 
356: 
''In addition, we think the court stated the 
issue of contributory negligence to the jury in such 
terms that it might be thought that assumption of 
the risk w.as a good defense, contrary to 45U.S.C. 
A. § 54. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 
U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610. The relevant 
portion of the charge was as follows: 
" 'Now, as to the question of contributory 
negligence, which has been talked about in this 
case: Owen Johnson had been working part time 
it is true, but he had been doing this job before. 
Is there anything that he did at the time that con-
tributed to it~ He knew what his condition was. He 
testified that the slightest hang on this bone might 
be an aggravation of this condition. He claims he 
wasn't warned and that that violated their rule by 
not warning him. But Del Guidice, his own wit-
ness, testfied that it was a normal coupling that 
happened every night, and presumably every night 
they didn't stop to warn him because it was so 
gentle that nobody was pushed around. At least, 
you will be entitled to infer that from the testi-
mony of Del Guidice.' 
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"From this it rnight have been thought that 
it was permissible to infer that, because on other 
occasions when the plaintiff was at work the loco-
motive crew did not warn the mail car occupants, 
the plaintiff had assumed the risk of an unexpect-
ed coupling of normal force. The specific excep-
tion to this passage was well taken.'' 
If the injured employee here was entitled to a new trial 
by reason of the Court's error, is Thomas Sprunt not 
entitled to an equal consideration~ Is not 1\tfr. Sprunt's 
knowledge of the condition the sole basis for the claim 
of negligence ~ 
In Southern Railway Co. v. Welch, Tenn. 6th Circuit, 
247 F. 2d 340, the evidence was that on the days of the 
injury excessive grit, dirt and tar on the rails required 
extra force to pull the rails into proper position. Plain-
tiff alleges that he suffered a ruptured intervertebral 
disc by reason of the fact that he was not given extra 
men. The case was tried without a jury. The defendant 
appealed, alleging that 'there was no evidence of any 
negligence and in fact that the evidence showed that the 
plaintiff had not asked for any assistance and as a con-
sequence his action was barred. The court disposed of this 
argument, stating at page 341: 
"Defendant's second contention arises out of 
the fact found by the District Court, that plaintiff 
did not request additional help nor 1uake use of 
the help available. It urges that these facts bar 
recovery and require reYersal. These objections, 
however, are based essentially on the doctrines 
of assumption of risk and of contributory negli-
gence. But, since the enacbnent of 1939, 45 F.S.C. 
A. Section 51 et seq., 'every vestige of the doctrine 
of assumption of risk' has been eliminated from 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Tiller v. 
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 318 U.S. 
54, 63 S. ·Ct. 444, 446, 87 L.Ed. 610. See also 
Thompson v. Camp, 6 Cir., 163 F. 2d 396, 402, 
which held that neither assumption of risk nor 
contributory negligence is a bar under the present 
Act." 
On the basis of the evidence, the plaintiff was en-
titled to have the court give its requested instructions to 
the effect that he was not guilty of any contributory 
negligence. 
It is true that the court instructed the jury that 
assumption of risk was not a defense and that it further 
instructed the jury that the burden of proving contribu-
tory negligence was on the defendant. However, it is 
submitted that there was no evidence introduced showing 
that the plaintiff's conduct in any way departed from 
that of a reasonably prudent employee in his situation. 
The defendant introduced no evidence to show that his 
conduct was in any way different from any other em-
ployee. It did not attempt to show that the plaintiff did 
anything in any fashion different from an ordinary pru-
dent person. On the contrary, it argued that the fact 
he was hurt should not have happened because he had 
knowledge that there were holes in the roadbed and that 
had he exercised ordinary care he would not have been 
hurt, without attempting to show either that he knew or 
should have known of the existence of a hole under the 
snow in the area in which he was about to step. I should 
like to recall again the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
in the Tiller case : 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"'Assumption of risk' by an e1nployee may be 
a way of expressing the conclusion that he has 
been guilty of contributory negligence. But an 
employee cannot be charged with contributory 
negligence simply because he 'assumed the risk;' 
the inquiry is, did his conduct depart from that 
of a reasonably prudent employee in his situa-
tion~" 
The defendant made no effort and introduced no 
evidence in conformity with that requirement of the Su-
preme Court of the United States. It is submitted that 
a result thereof the court erred in permitting the jury to 
consider whether the facts at bar constituted contribu-
tory negligence, facts which have never been held to con-
stitute negligence but which have always been held to 
constitute the defense of assumption of risk. 
Fortunately, the question has been categorically 
answered by the Federal Courts. In the case of Williams 
v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 190 F.2d 744, the railroad 
attempted to claim that the employee was guilty of con-
tributory negligence because the employee continued to 
work in an area which he knew was defective by reason 
of the negligence of his employer in failing to provide a 
safe place to work. The Court ruled against the railroad 
saying at page 748: 
"Indeed, even though the employee may know 
that the employer has been negligent in the fur-
nishing of a safe place to work or necessary safety 
equipment, the employee does not under this Act 
assume the risks of such danger. Title 45 U.S.C.A. 
§ 54-; Tiller, Exee, v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. 
Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610.'' 
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Finally, in Thomas v. Union Railway Company, 6th 
Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d 18, the plaintiff slipped on grease 
allegedly left on the round house floor. It was not argued 
that the railroad was guilty of negligence in permitting 
the grease to remain on the concrete. However, the De-
fendant contended that it should be exonerated from lia-
bility by reason of the fact that the employee knew that 
this condition existed. The Court of Appeals reversed 
a decision, a jury verdict for the defendant, saying at 
pages 19 and 20 : 
"(1,2) The trial court charged the jury that 
the railroad was not liable for injuries sustained 
from dangers that were obvious or as well known 
to the injured party as to the railroad; and that 
if the jury found from the evidence a dangerous 
condition of the concrete floor near the foreman's 
office, in the roundhouse or deficient lighting 
facilities in that place, 'if such dangerous condi-
tion existed, was obvious, or as well known to the 
plaintiff Thomas as to the railroad, the defendant 
would not be liable for injury sustained from such 
dangerous condition.' The foregoing charged the 
employee with assumption of risk. This was error, 
as 'every vertige of the doctrine of assumption of 
risk was obliterated from the law (the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act) by the 1939 amend-
ment.' Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 318 
U.S. 54, 58, 63 S. Ct. 444, 446, 87 L. Ed. 610. Even 
though the employee may know that the employ-
er has been negligent in the furnishing of a safe 
place to work, the employee does not, under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, assume the 
risks of such danger. Williams v. Atlantic Coast 
LineR. Co., 5 Cir., 190 F. 2d 744, 748." 
This view finds complete acceptance in the Restate-
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ment of the Law of Torts which defines assumption of 
risk at Section 893, page 344 as follows: 
"The defense of assumption of risk is not 
dependent upon the defendant's knowledge or be-
lief as to the plaintiff's state of mind but depends 
upon the plaintiff's risk to which he exposes him-
self." 
Indeed, the illustration, No. 14, on page 351 could 
almost use the language of Justice Frankfurter in the 
Tiller case supra. This illustration provides at page 351 
as follows: 
"14. A is employed by 2 in a State in which 
by statute it is provided that, 'in an action for 
personal injuries caused by visible defects for 
which an employer would be liable but for the de-
fense of asumption of risk, the fact that the em-
ployee continues in the employment after he has 
been informed of the danger shall not be an as-
sumption of the risk of injury therefrmn.' He is 
employed in a building at work in which it is nec-
essary to use a rope ladder which, as A knows, 
is dangerous because not fastened at the bottom. 
He is hurt by falling frmn the ladder. A is entitled 
to recover from B unless his fall is caused by his 
failure to be reasonably alert and watchful of 
his own safety in using the ladder." 
It is obvious that the fact that the plaintiff Thomas 
Sprunt knew and had known of the dangerous defective 
condition of the roadbed upon which he was compelled to 
work and knowing of the situation and recognizing the 
risks to which he was exposed, does not render hi1n negli-
gent but it does in fact constitute the defense of assmnp-
tion of risk-a defense which is not available to the de-
fendant in this action and which cannot be used by him 
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under the guise of contributory negligence to reduce in 
whole or in part the damages to which the plaintiff is 
entitled. 
These facts are not sufficient to predicate a determi-
nation that Thomas Sprunt was two-thirds responsible 
for his accident and consequent injury. 
Is there any other facts or theories which added to 
the above facts would give the defendant railroad any 
comfort~ That the only suggestion is that is to be gained 
comes from the suggestion that it was not necessary for 
Mr. Sprunt to board the car at the precise place he did; 
that he could in fact have selected some other place. The 
statement that Mr. Sprunt could have selected another 
place from which to mount the car must be considered in 
light of the following circumstances. The switching opera-
tion was on the premises of the Vitro Uranium Company. 
It was necessary for him to mount the car in order that 
the engineer could see him when he was passing signals 
so that what the plaintiff was doing was essential and a 
necessary part of his job. The roadbed in the vicinity of 
where plaintiff and other members of his switching crew 
were working had been pitted and in a generally unsafe 
condition for several months. In September, before the 
accident to plaintiff, conditions were so bad that company 
safety officials could not walk along that roadbed in ox-
fords. This was a general condition not a special condi-
tion. At the time plaintiff fell, it had been snowing and 
the holes had filled with snow so that neither plaintiff 
nor his fellow employees could tell precisely where the 
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holes were located. No evidence was introduced to show 
that plaintiff knew of the existence, of the hole ~t:n which 
he stepped nor was any evidence introduced to indicate 
that plaintiff knew or should have known that any other 
place in the area would have been safer for plaintiff to 
use as a boarding point except that provided by hind-
sight. 
No evidence was introduced to show that there was 
an area in the immediate vicinity or in the general vicini-
ty that was free of holes and that would have provided 
safe footing for the plaintiff. On the contrary, all of the 
evidence indicated that no safe area did in fact exist. 
Under these facts, does the fact that the plaintiff 
could have mounted the car from an area other than that 
from which he selected constitute negligence? The answer 
to this of necessity is an unequivocable negative. 
However, before going into an examination of what 
the l~w is relative to choice, I should like to point out to 
this Court the following items: 
1. The defendant in its answer did not allege any 
facts which raise this theor~~ of contributory 
negligence. 
2. Defendant at the pretrail did not mention this 
theory. 
3. The Defendant did not suggest to the trial 
court any such theory. 
4. The defendant did not subn1it any requested 
instructions e1nbodying said theory. 
5. The Court did not advise the jury as to the 
elmnents necessary to find contributory neg-
ligence on the theory of an election. 
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The rule as to choice is set down in the case of 
Stricklin v. Rosemeyer, Calif., 142 P2d 953 wherein it 
was alleged that a plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence because the plaintiff alighted from a parked 
vehicle on the left side when in fact he could have opened 
the door from the right side. 
The court made a succinct statement as to the law 
relative to choice as follows: 
"The rule is accurately stated in 38 Am. Jr. 
p. 873, as follows: 'One having a choice between 
methods of doing an act which are equally avail-
able, who chooses the more dangerous of the 
methods, is ordinarily deemed negligent, in the 
absence of a showing of the existence of an emer-
gency, sudden peril, or other circumstances justi-
fying such choice. The fact that the less danger-
ous method takes longer and is inconvenient and 
attended with difficulties furnishes no excuse for 
knowingly encountering peril.' The exceptions to 
the application of the rule are also noted, but no 
one is pertinent here." 
One of the requirements set forth in the rule is knowl-
edge and one is not necessarily contributorily negligent 
even though he or she chooses a way that was in fact less 
safe. In Williams v. City of Hobba, N. Mex., 249 P. 2d 
765, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was negli-
gent because she admitted that she was familiar with a 
dangerous condition of the sidewalk. The court stated the 
question as follows : 
"In treating the contention the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in 
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to walk along the sidewalk rather than in the ad .. 
jacent street or other nearby streets, our inquiry 
is not whether she actually chose the least safe 
of the ways available to her, but whether she 
failed to exercise that degree of care required 
of a reasonably prudent person under the circum-
stances.'' 
The court stated the question as follows: 
"In the present case we cannot say as a 
matter of law that the plaintiff \vas guilty of con-
tributory negligence in choosing to walk upon the 
sidewalk, even though she was well aware of its 
dangerous condition. It was the only sidewalk in 
the neighborhood; the street it paralleled was 
unlighted; neither that street nor the nearby 
streets were paved and a recent rain had left them 
muddy and wet; the plaintiff had used the walk 
in safety many times before, as had other persons. 
Under these circumstances minds might reason-
ably differ as to whether the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent in the choice she made, and 
the question is, therefore, one for the jury." 
The State of Utah has long recognized the problem 
inherent in an election or choice as will be seen in Tuc-
kett v. American Steam & Hand Laundry, 84 P. 500, and 
in Stam v. Ogden Packi·ng & Provision Co., 177 P. 218. 
As was stated in K aumaus v TFhite Star Gas & Ovl Co., 
Utah, 63 P. 2d 231, "The n1ere fact that the servant was 
aware that he was exposing himself to danger does not 
ntake him guilty of contributory negligence.·· 
There are two recent cases in Utah bearing directly 
upon the problen1 of contributory negligence of a plain-
tiff involving an election. In Baker v. Decker, Vtah, 212 
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P. 2d 679, the plaintiff, an elderly woman of 70 years of 
age, fell while walking along a second story hallway in the 
Roosevelt Apartments in Salt Lake City. The defendant 
showed that there were three means that the plaintiff 
could have used to depart from her apartment but that 
she chose one where it was obvious repair work was being 
done, that she saw on the floor of the hallway the folded 
uneven canvas that the repairman had laid on the floor, 
that notwithstanding previous knowledge on the part of 
the plaintiff, she elected to pursue that particular route, 
caught her heel on the fold or uneven part of the canvas 
and fell. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant 
appealed, alleging that the respondent was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law in pursuing the 
course she took because there was a safer course readily 
available. The court in disposing of this case quoted 
with approval from 11! oore v. Miles, Utah, 158 P. 2d 676, 
stating at page 682: 
"In our decision in that case we quoted with 
approval the following excerpt from the case of 
Tillotson v. City of Davenport, 232 Iowa 44, 4 
N.W. 2d 365, 366: 'It is well settled that mere 
knowledge that a walk is dangerous, unsafe for 
travel, is not sufficient to establish contributory 
negligence though there is another way that is 
safe and convenient, and to defeat recovery it 
must appear that the traveler knew or as an 
ordinarily cautious person should have known 
that it was imprudent to use the walk." 
The court then went on to deal with the problem 
raised by the fact that it was conceded that the plaintiff 
knew and saw the alleged hazard. The Court disposed of 
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that problem by stating: 
"Conceding that ·respondent saw the equip-
ment in the hall, unless it was imprudent for her 
to proceed along that course she was not bound 
to take a safer way. The danger portrayed by 
the manner in which the equipment was placed in 
the hall was not so serious that plaintiff can be 
charged with indiscretion or lack of due care in 
not deviating from her usual course of exit from 
the building." 
Where does the defendant claim the evidence shows 
the plaintiff knew or should have known that it was im-
prudent to attempt to board the car where he did 1 
The view set forth in Baker v. Decker, supra found 
approval again in Wold v. Ogden City, Utah, 258, P. 2d 
453. 
In the facts at bar, the evidence is clear that Sprunt 
did not know of the existence of the hole in which he 
stepped. There was no evidence to indicate that moving to 
any other place would have been any safer, nor was 
there any evidence to indicate that it was imprudent on 
the part of Mr. Sprunt to attempt to board the car at 
the place he did save as a matter of hindsight. 
The Restaten1ent of the Law of Torts again 
conclusively establishes that the plaintiff cannot be 
held to have been guilty of contributory negligence 
under these facts. And it states, at Section 893, page 
346 as follows : 
"* * * On the other hand where the defendant 
had no right to act dangerously or to maintain 
a dangerous condition after knowledge of it by the 
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plaintiff, the fact that the plaintiff choose to 
subject himself to a known risk does not neces-
sarily bar him fr01n recovery. * * * In all such 
cases the risk has not been thrust upon him. 
Either the defendant was negligent with respect 
to the plaintiff in view of a situation in which 
the plaintiff had properly placed himself, or the 
defendant was otherwise tortious in creating a 
situation in which it was necessary for the plain-
tiff to take such a risk in order to protect an in-
terest of his own or that of a third person against 
the consequences of the defendant's conduct. 
"If, however, the plaintiff in making his 
choice, adopts a course of conduct which would 
not have been adopted by a reasonably prudent 
man in the light of the alternative open to him, 
he may be barred from recovery. This is a form of 
contributory negligence which has been frequently 
called 'voluntary assumption of risk'. This is an 
application of the phrase made for convenience to 
indicate a defense based upon the fact that the 
plaintiff is aware of the risk and chooses to con-
tinue." 
Illustration No. 5 is closest to the facts involved 
herein and provides as follows at page 348: 
"5. The A railroad company negligently per-
mits a slippery substance to remain on the floor 
in front of its ticket window. B, a traveler enter-
ing to purchase a ticket, which he has a right to do 
as a member of the public, realizes that he cannot 
avoid stepping on the substance if he is to pur-
chase a ticket, but reasonably believes that with 
care he can avoid slipping. Although he advances 
with due care he nevertheless slips and is hurt. 
B is entitled to recover damages from A." 
From the above, it will be seen that there is no way 
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on the basis of the evidence produced at this trial that 
the plaintiff can be found guilty of contributory negli-
gence. In the first place, it would be essential to find 
that the plaintiff knew specifically of the danger he was 
running and that he further knew of a safer course which 
a reasonably prudent person would have selected to take. 
Again, let us state that there is no evidence either that 
there was a safer course or that if such a safer course 
existed that the plaintiff knew of or should have known 
of its existence. On the contrary, all of the evidence 
negates any presumption that either a safer place or 
safer method existed or that plaintiff knew of it. No evi-
dence was introduced nor claimed to exist that discloses 
any safer place. On the contrary, all the evidence demon-
strates that this place was duplicated throughout the area 
generally. 
It is apparent that the evidence does not meet the 
test required to submit the question of choice as a basis 
for contributory negligence to a jury. Had the court been 
requested to instruct the jury on this issue that the Court 
would have been duty bound to refuse such an instruction. 
It would appear, therefore, that the defendant is 
left with a principle of law as its justification for a find-
ing of contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff that 1s completely and totally unsupported by the 
facts. 
POINT II 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES IS INADEQUATE IN LAW. 
This suit originated by reason of a personal injury 
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sustained by the Plaintiff while in the employment of the 
Defendant on the 4th day of January, 1957. Mr. Sprunt 
received a tear of the rotorcuff of his left arm as a result 
of a fall which occurred during the course of his employ-
ment. Although he had some previous injury, the ortho-
pedic surgeon who treated him stated there was no causal 
connection between any prior injury and the injury he 
sustained on the 4th day of January. (Tr. 72, 73). Nor 
did this injury in any way constitute an aggravation of 
any pre-existing condition (Tr. 79). As a result of the 
injury, the Plaintiff sustained a 50o/o loss of function 
of the left arrn (Tr. 84) which disqualified him physically 
from working as a switchman (Tr. 84). His disqualifica-
tion is permanent (Tr. 84). 
The jury found in favor of the Plaintiff and against 
the Defendant and awarded damages in the sum of 
$15,000.00. However, the jury further diminished the 
amount recovered in the amount of $10,000.00 saying 
that in effect that the negligence of the plaintiff was at 
least two-thirds responsible for his injury. 
At the time of Plaintiff's injury, he was employed as 
a switchman at the rate of $20.30 per day. This amount 
was stipulated as a daily rate of pay by the counsel for 
the Defendant. Plaintiff had some thirty (30) years 
senority and he had enough senority that he could have 
worked five day per week (Tr. 48). After his release 
from the doctor he made an effort to obtain other em-
ployment but has been unable to find any other than the 
position of driving a cab ( Tr. 48). He commenced work-
ing in this job on January 25, 1958 and makes approxi-
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mately $90.00 per month at said employment. 
No evidence was introduced by the Defendant to 
indicate either that other employment was available to 
the Plaintiff or that he could have earned at other em-
ployment an amount in excess of $90.00 per month. 
As of the date of trial his loss of pay equalled 
$6,432.00, which would have to be reduced by his earned 
income as a taxi driver, leaving a loss of pay as of the 
date of trial of $5,802.30. There was no evidence to indi-
cate that he had any other difficulty with his health. He 
had a life expectancy in excess of twenty years. Even 
assuming that he would only work until the age of 65, 
an annuity purchased at the date of the trial would cf)st 
approximately $25,000.00, which together with his dam-
ages of the date of trial would mean that he would have 
received a monetary loss in excess of $30,000.00. That 
would be only a dollar and cents loss and include no 
award for pain, suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, 
the permanent injury sustained, or otherwise. For a jury 
to find that he was only damaged in the amount of 
$15,000.00 is absurd and can only mean a complete dis-
regrd of the elements of dmnages set forth by the Court. 
Counsel for the defendant argued that he could obtain 
employment that would earn him in excess of $90.00 
which he stated he was able to earn. However, the un-
contradicted evidence \Yas that he had made search for 
employment and was unable to obtain any other employ-
nlent by reason of his age and that all he had been able 
to earn was $90.00 per n1onth. The defendant argued 
facts to the jury which \Yere not in evidence and the only 
36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
explanation for the determination of the size of the award 
must be that the jury considered the argument of counsel 
as being facts rather than argument and that they dis-
regarded the testimony or the lack of it. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Bodon v. 
Suhrmann have adopted the position that it is within the 
discretion of the trial court to increase a judgment 
brought in by a jury, stating: 
"We affirm the responsibility of this court 
to be indulgent toward the verdict of the jury, and 
not to disturb it so long as it is within the bounds 
of reason, in accordance 'With the principles set 
forth in the companion case of Schneider v. Surh-
mann; and also that it is primarily the perogative 
and duty of the trial court to pass upon the ade-
quacy of the verdict and to order any necessary 
modification thereof. Nevertheless, when the ver-
dict is outside the limits of any reasonable ap-
praisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it 
should not be permitted to stand, and if the trial 
court fails to rectify it, we are obliged to make the 
correction on appeal." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff is 
entitled to have a full judgment of $15,000.00 restored 
to him by reason of the fact that there is no evidence in 
the record that in any way justifies the finding of con-
tributory negligence on the part of _Mr. Sprunt that in 
any way contributed to or proximately caused his in-
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jury. It is further submitted that l\fr. Sprunt is en-
titled to have the amount of $15,000 increased by a 
minimum of $10,000.00 or be granted a new trial by 
reason of the fact that the total amount of damages 
found by the jury were inadequate and unrealistic as a 
matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PATTERSON 
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